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Abstract: Mercier & Sperber claim that the phenomenon of belief bias – which they 
consider to be an archetypal manifestation of a general confirmation bias in human 
reasoning – provides fundamental support for their argumentative theory and its basis in 
intuitive judgement. We propose that chronometric evidence necessitates a more nuanced 
account of belief bias that is not readily captured by argumentative theory. 
 
Mercier & Sperber’s (M&S’s) impressive argumentative theory reassesses the function of 
reasoning, not as involving the noble pursuit of truth, but instead as a Machiavellian 
  
communicative art with persuasion and self-interest at its core. A case in point is the 
infamous confirmation bias, whereby individuals seem motivated to seek confirmatory 
evidence for their existing beliefs and hypotheses and fail to look for counter-evidence or 
counter-arguments (Nickerson 1998). M&S claim that a quintessential demonstration of 
confirmation bias that supports their theory can be seen in the phenomenon of belief bias, 
where some contemporary theories suggest that people try to confirm believable 
conclusions but disconfirm unbelievable ones (see the selective processing model 
described by Evans 2007, and the multinomial model of Klauer et al. 2000). Thus, in both 
the case of believable and unbelievable conclusions, M&S claim that people show a 
motivation “to confirm their initial intuition” (sect. 3.3, para. 3) with unbelievable 
conclusions effectively promoting an intuition-guided debias (Evans 2000) leading to 
improved logical responding. M&S further propose that, when people deal with an 
unbelievable conclusion, “it is not that they reason more in this case. . . . It is just that the 
direction reasoning takes is mostly determined by the participants’ initial intuitions” (sect 
3.3, para. 3). 
 Our contention, however, is that this latter claim flies in the face of current 
chronometric evidence in the belief-bias literature, which suggests that a more subtle 
interpretation of the phenomenon is needed that is not couched purely in terms of the 
operation of a general confirmation bias. In particular, processing-time data for 
syllogistic arguments consistently indicate that participants reason most when the 
conclusion is believable but invalid (Ball et al. 2006; Stupple & Ball 2008; Thompson et 
al. 2003). Such a finding is inconsistent with M&S’s view that people simply seek 
support for prior beliefs. Confirmatory mental models of the premises of arguments with 
  
believable-invalid conclusions are readily available, so why should significantly longer 
processing times arise with these problems? We propose instead that many participants 
show a capacity to inhibit confirmation-oriented processing with such arguments, with 
the resulting attempt at logical analysis taking time to apply. Of course, the complexity of 
the required logical processing means that a belief-based response may still often win out, 
perhaps with people defaulting to such a response under cognitive load (cf. Quayle & 
Ball 2000). This would produce a response pattern that looks like confirmatory 
behaviour, but where the chronometric data support a very different account of the 
processing that is actually taking place. 
 To elaborate on our proposals we outline three possible routes that participants 
could take through Evans’s (2007) selective processing model when confronted with 
belief-oriented syllogistic arguments (cf. Ball, 2010; Evans 2009). First, participants 
could employ a pure response bias and respond in accordance with belief without 
engaging any analytic processing whatsoever, either for a truth-seeking or argumentative 
purpose. Second, in accordance with argumentative theory, participants could seek 
confirmatory evidence so as to warrant the acceptance of believable conclusions 
(including believable-invalid ones) and the refutation of unbelievable conclusions 
(including unbelievable-valid ones). Finally, participants could attempt to suspend 
notions of belief and disbelief altogether. For example, rather than searching for a 
supporting model for an believable-invalid conclusion, they would inhibit a heuristic 
response as well as confirmatory-oriented analytic response, instead engaging in an 
exhaustive search for a model of the premises that provides a counter-example to the 
given conclusion. 
  
 The important question that follows from our analysis is this: What if examples of 
all three reasoning approaches were present in belief-bias data sets? We suggest that the 
resulting aggregation of these strategies would lead to the pattern of response times that 
has typically been observed (Ball et al. 2006; Stupple & Ball 2008; Thompson et al. 
2003), with believable-invalid conclusions being associated with extended processing 
times relative to other problems because of the presence of a sub-set of reasoners who 
resist intuitive judgements. This group of reasoners would most likely be those described 
by Stanovich and West (2000) as adopting the “normative construal” of the task because 
they possess the cognitive capacity needed to reason through demanding deductive 
problems. 
 This latter interpretation of chronometric findings is supported by data that we 
have recently acquired (for a preliminary report, see Ball, 2010) demonstrating that 
increased response times for believable-invalid problems are predictive of increased 
overall response accuracies across belief-oriented problems (i.e., these times reflect the 
behaviour of high-ability reasoners). These data also concur with the observation by 
Thompson et al. (2010) that the participants who spend more time reasoning are more 
likely to reach a logical conclusion. However, Thompson et al. propose an alternative 
interpretation of the inflated inspection times for believable-invalid problems that is more 
in keeping with argumentative theory than our account. In their Modified Verbal 
Reasoning theory they suggest that participants are motivated to find confirmatory 
support for believable problems and so allow an extended response deadline for such 
problems (perhaps an attractive proposition for the argumentative theory). Thompson et 
al. claim that since the reasoning process is more difficult for invalid than valid problems, 
  
this combined with the increased motivation to support believable conclusions results in 
the corresponding increase in response times for believable-invalid problems. We would 
argue, however, that in adopting this perspective one would expect a far greater 
acceptance rate for believable-invalid problems than is observed (acceptances are 
typically in the 50%–70% range), since a confirming model is readily available to those 
participants who expend the effort trying to find one. 
 In sum, we disagree with M&S’s assertion that a motivated attempt at 
confirmation necessarily drives belief-bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. Instead, we 
claim that many participants attempt to seek out the deductive truth of presented 
arguments and do so at the considerable cognitive expense of inhibiting their intuitive 
judgements, as is particularly evident in the case of syllogisms with believable-invalid 
conclusions. On this issue, at least, we would argue against M&S’s argumentative theory, 
but perhaps we cannot rule out having done so in order to confirm a pre-existing 
hypothesis.<C-Text ends> 
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